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MORTGAGES.
THE NECESSITY OF DESCRIBING THE SECURITY UPON THE REGISTRY.
MORTGAGES

TO

SECURE

FUTURE

ADVANCES2

AND

WHERE THE

SECURITIES HAVE BEEN CHANGED.
I.

WHAT rOEm OF CONDITION AND REGISTRY ISoVALID;

HOW FAR THE SECURITIES

MAY BE CHANGED, WITHOUT AFFECTING THE VALIDITY OF THE LIEN.

1. The question not the same under a registry system, as where no such exists.
2. The early cases seem to require that the securities be described on the registry.
3. The early doctrine of condemning all general mortgages now abandoned.
4. Other cases admitted of general description of the debt upon the registry.
5. This led to great looseness and indefiniteness of description in the conditions of
registered mortgages.
6. So that now a mortgage to secure future advances, or an unsettled balance of
present indebtedness, may be in the form of a gross sum now due.
7. But such gross sum cannot be made to cover debts not contemplated at the
1
time.
8. Analysis of the nature of liability which may be made the subject of mortgage
security.
9. This relaxation of the early practice seems justified by another relaxation, now
firmly established, that of allowing the. change of securities.
10. This latter is too firmly established to be brought in question.
11. No presumptive payment of a mortgage unless that was the evident intention.
12. This rule constantly applied to banking paper.
13 and 14. Some marked cases of the application of the rule to banking paper
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15. The result of the authorities stated.
16. There is more difficulty in reducing the facts of the different cases to the same
result, but they have been often decided upon the facts.
17. And are thus made to turn upon the intention, rather than the form.
II.

MORTGAGES

TO SECURE FUTURE ADVANCES.

THE FORM AND EXTENT OF NOTICIS

REQUISITE TO DEFEAT THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE SUCH ADVANCES.

1. The germ of this species of contract is found in the Roman civil law.
2. But it appears not quite the same as the English law of tacking.
8. The English law of tacking further illustrated.
4. It seems not founded upon the clearest equity.

5. If the third morigagee had notice of the second mortgage at the date of his
own, he was excluded from the right.
6. Contracts for future advances, if absolute, the same as present indebtedness.
7. The most important class of such contracts optional with both parties
8. Has reference chiefly to running money accounts. Bankers, &c.
9. Statement of the English rule. Gordon vs. Graham..
10. This case reversed by Sir JoIrN ROMILLY, in Shaw vs. Neal.
11. Further reviewed in Rolt vs. Hopkinson. Overruled.
12 and 13. Exposition of the principles involved in the present English rule.
14. The requisite notice to terminate the right to make further advances. The
registry sufficient in some States.
15. Most of the cases require notice in fact and in such form as to gain credit.
16. Further exposition of the rule, as defined by different judges.

1. The question how far securities described in a registered
mortgage may be changed, without affecting the lien of the mortgagee, is one of great interest and, in some cases, of a good deal
of nicety. Ther same difficulty might not always occur, where no
registry existed. For in such cases there would not be the same
opportunity to impose upon new parties, by representing the debt
as paid, by producing the securities described in the registry.
2. Some of the early cases seem to require that the security
shall be correctly and intelligibly described upon the registry.
As in Frost vs. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 288, S. 0. 18 Johns.
R. 544, where it is held that the registry of a mortgage to secure
a, promissory note of $3000, as for one of $300, is good only for
the $300. This is upon the principle that the registry is not for
the purpose of putting one upon inquiry merely, but to give full
knowledge of the contents of the deed and of the security. It
therefore does not come wi-hin the principle, it was said, that the
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recital of a deed is notice of the contents of such deed, since it
puts the party upon his inquiry, and he must 'be supposed to pursue
it till he find the recited deed, unless something is shown to have
occurred short of that to satisfy the mind of the party; and
naturally calculated to divert him from further inquiry. Taylor
vs. Stibbert, 2 Vesey Jr. 437; Eiern vs. Mill, 13 Vesey 114;
Hall vs. Smith, 14 Vesey 426 ; Jackson vs. Meeley, 10 Johns. R.
874. But it was urged that the registry must go further, and
show the precise state of the security. Accordingly:
3. In: Pettibone vs. Ghriwold, 4 Conn. R. 158, it was decided,
that, where the condition of a mortgage deed was, that the mortgagor should pay all notes, which the mortgagee might indorse or
give for the mortgagor, and all receipts which the mortgagee
might hold against him, the deed was void as against the other
creditors of the mortgagor. This was put, or attempted to be put,
upon the same ground assumed by the New York courts in Frost
vs. Beekman, that those interested in the registry were not bound
to look beyond it, and must be able to determine from that, the
precise state of the title. The learned judge here did not seem to
have adverted to the difference between the two cases. When the
registry, on its face, seems to be perfect, but is not so, it necessarily misleads the party, who will naturally'rely upon it. On the
other hand, where the notice upon the registry is general, as by
reference to other deeds, or instruments, whether to define the
estate conveyed, or the extent of the condition of a mortgage, it
has no such tendency to mislead, any more than such a recital in
the deed itself would have that effect upon one seeing the deed.
And if such a recital in the deed is valid notice of its contents as
between the parties, there is no reason, why the registry 'of the
deed should not be as good notice to creditors and purchasers, as
the production of the deed itself, or full notice of its contents,
which it has never been doubted made the deed as good, as to other
parties, having such notice, as it was between the grantor and
grantee. And it is no more requisite that those interested in knowing the state of land titles should be able to determine it from an
inspection of the registry than that they should be able to do it
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without looking beyond the deeds, provided these had been shown
them. And it would scarcely be contended that any deed, in such
form as to be valid between the parties, would not be equally valid,
as to creditors and purchasers, unless it was fraudulent, in fact, or
calculated to mislead others, nothing of which is relied upon in
Griswold vs. Pettibone, supra. The truth is that this case was
early understood to have been put upon ground not maintainable,
and has consequently been abandoned in that state, as their reports
show, in numerous cases. All that is now required, in that state,
is, that the contracts secured by a mortgage should be described
with such convenient certainty as the case admits of. Stoughton
vs. Pasco, 5 Conn. R. 442; Bart vs. Chalker, 14 Conn. 79;
Merrills vs. Swift, 18 Id. 257; Sanford vs. Wheeler, 13 Id. 165;
Lewis vs. De Forest, 20 Id. 427; Mix vs. Cowles, Id. 420. See
also, to the same purport, ,9kilman vs. Teeple, Saxton's R. 232; 1
Hilliard on Mort. 285-297.
4. And in some of the states it has been held, that the mortgage
will be valid as against future incumbrances, where the debt is
either so described in the condition of the deed, that its identity
can be traced, or such information given that those interested may
be able, upon proper inquiry, to trace it out. Garber vs. Henry,
6 Watts 57; Gardner vs. Webber, 17 Pick. R. 414; Commercial
Bank vs. Cunningham, 24 Pick. R. 274. And all that is at
present required, in the way of describing the debt secured, or
intended to be secured, by a mortgage, is that it should be capable
of clear identification, either by matter upon the record, or else by
that, in connection with facts proved aliunde, and which may be
regarded as pointed at by the registry.
5. Under this rule great looseness and indefiniteness of description has been admitted, both as to present and future indebtedness
intended to be secured, where it is clearly made to appear that it
was the bond fide purpose of the parties to secure the debt in
question, and that there was no fraudulent purpose as to others.
As in the case of The Commercial Bank vs. Cunningham, 24
Pick. R. 270, where a copartnership executed a mortgage to secure
a promissory note, and took from the creditor an instrument,
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not recorded, which set forth that such note was held as collateral
security for the payment or discharge of certain other notes and
liabilities of the mortgagor, and that !he note and mortgage were
to be held as long as the mortgagors should be under any liability
of any sort to the creditor: It was held that the mortgage was
not fraudulent as against other creditors or.bond fide purchasers;
and that new notes given to the creditor, whether in renewal of
the new notes, or not, were covered by the mortgage, notwithstanding the members of the firm had changed and the new notes
were made or indorsed in the name of the new firm. And notes,
secured by mortgage, given for a round sum, where nothing was
due that was intended to be secured, but the object was merely to
indemnify the mortgagee against future liabilities expected to be
incurred, and where this was evidenced by a writing between the
parties, not recorded, have been held valid securities, as against
all debts and- securities accruing after the mortgagee had assumed
responsibilities. Crardnervs. Webber, 17 Pick. R. 407; Jame8 vs.
Johnson, 6 Johns. Oh. R. 417, 429.
6. It seems now perfectly well settled that a mortgage to secure
future advances, maybe in the form of a gross sum expressed on the
face of the instrument as present indebtedness. The Bank of Utica
vs. Pinch, 8 Barb. Ch. R. 294. And so may a mortgage be taken
in this general form to secure present indebtedness arising out of
complicated transactions where it may be difficult to describe the
securities, or the debts, except in this general way. Bank of Utica,
vs. Pinch, supra.
7. But this must be a constituent part of the original agreement.
And where such debts have been all once paid, it has been held
not competent to keep the security on foot, and to apply it to other
indebtedness, by virtue of a parol. contract to that effect. Bank
of Utica vs. Pinch, supra; Truscott vs. King, 2 Selden R. 147;
Mead vs. York, Id. 449 ; 4 Kent Comm. 176 ; Ex parte Hooper,
19 Vesey 477; Meland vs. Cray, 2 Y. & C. 199.
8. The forms of these conditions have been very much varied,
but since the general principle is now firmly established, that a
general description of the indebtedness in the condition of a mort-
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gage is sufficient, as against creditors and bond fide future incum.
brancers and purchasers, the courts have manifested a laudable
disposition not to exclude any security, which was relied upon in
good faith, at the time the advances were made and subsequently.
Hence mortgages to secure blank indorsements by the mortgagee
have been held valid, as against creditors whose securities accrued
after the date of such indorsements, but before any payment upon
them, or even before the bills are put in circulation. Burdett vs.
Clay, 8 B. Mon. 287. And it will be equally valid if given to
secure future indorsements. Kramer vs. The Bank, 15 Ohio 253;
or even to secure one for signing the bond of an executor, as
surety. Rawkins vs. May, 12 Alabama R. 673. And a mortgage
to secure the mortgagee "what I may owe him on book," was
not only held valid, to secure any existing indebtedness, but it
appearing that no such indebtedness existed, at the date of the
mortgage, to which it could have been intended to apply, it was
held that it should be construed to apply to any future indebtedness on book. McDaniels vs. Colvin, 16 Verm. R. 300. So also
a mortgage to secure all debts due and all suretyships of the
mortgagor for the mortgagee was held a valid security for all
existing liabilities. Vanneter vs. Vanneter, 3 Gratt. 148. And
in a late case in Vermont it was decided that a mortgage to secure
the mortgagee "all the notes and agreements I now owe or have
with him," was a valid security to cover all payments made as
surety upon any indorsements made by the mortgagee on behalf
of the mortgagor, after the date of the mortgage, and before
knowledge of any intervening incumbrance, such indorsements
being made in pursuance of a contract in the form of a promissory
note for $1000, expressed upon its face to be collateral to and as
cc security for any demand or liability he then had or might thereafter have against or on account" of the mortgagor, such collateral
note existing at the date of the mortgage. Seymour vs. Darrow,
31 Vt. R. 122. And the leading case, in this country, upon the
subject, Shrras vs. Craig, 7 Crunch 34, was a mortgage
expressed to be for the security of thirty thousand pounds sterling,
when the real object of the deed was to secure ",different sums,
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due at the time from particular mortgagees, advances afterwards to
be made, and liabilities to be incurred to an uncertain amount."
But the security was nevertheless held valid, as against future
incumbrancers and creditors, even as to future advances made
before notice.,of any intervening equity.
9. We have not been able to perceive any valid objection to
this relaxation from the former cases, wbich will not equally go to
destroy all registered mortgages wherever the securities are changed.
And it cannot be denied that such an indulgence as that last named
does open a wide door for the practice of fraud. Very few persons
would hesitate to treat a mortgage, as probably paid, upon being
shown all the securities described in the condition, and especially
where they were overdue at th6 time. The idea of substituting a
new security, for one already overdue, would not commonly occur
to business men, unless in the case of banks, or moneyed institutions,
with whom such practice is more usiial, than to suffer the overdue
piper to remain unpaid.
10. But notwithstanding this liability to fraud and imposition,
and the notoriety of the fact, that some cases of considerable
severity do, from time to time, occur in this way, the law is
nevertheless settled, beyond all question, or cavil, that no change
of the securities will release the title of the mortgagee, so long as
the original indebtedness, or. any portion of it, remains uncancelled,
unless there is clear and satisfactory evidence, that the substituted
securities were intended to supersede the mortgage. security. Tripp
vs. Vincent, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 614. And where the personal obligation of the debtor is relinquished, or avoided, the mortgage
is nevertheless held as a binding security for the debt. Id. ;
Buswelt vs. -Davis, 10 N. H. 424. The same was held also'where
the bond secured by the mortgage was avoided for a fraudulent
alteration. Gillett vs. Powell, Spear's Ch. R. 142. But this last
decision may be regarded as questionable perhaps. And where
the creditor gives his debtor .ageneral release from the debt, or
from all debts and liabilities, this will be primd facie a release of
the mortgage. Armitage vs. Wickliffe, 12 B. Mlon. 488.
11. But no presumptive payment will be allowed to operate
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unless it is apparent this was the intention of the parties. As
where one promissory note is given for another. Watkins vs. Hill,
8 Pick. 522; Bank vs. Rose, 1 Strob. Eq. 257; Demshee vs.
Parmlee, 19 Vt. R. 172; lJ3cDonald vs. McDonald, 16 Vt. R.
630; Bolles vs. Chauncey, 8 Conn. R. 889; Pomroy vs. Rice, 16
Pick. R. 22.
12. The same rule has been repeatedly applied to banking
paper, where it is the custom to renew from time to time. °Enston
vs. Friday, 2 Rich. R. 427; Handy vs. Commercial Bank, 10 B.
Mon. 98; Smith vs. Prince, 14 Conn. R. 472. The change and
substitution of the parties by others will not affect the mortgage
security. 1V. H. Bank vs. Willard, 10 N. H. R. 210; Pond vs.
Clark, 14 Conn. R. 334. And the last case overruled the case
of Peters vs. Goodrich, 3 Conn. R. 146, which. held, in accordance
with the principle of Griswold vs. Pettibone, 8upra, and the earlier
cases, that as the registry must show the true state of the debt
secured by the mortgage, it could not be changed by renewal or
otherwise, without releasing the mortgage security.
18. And where a general security of $1500 was given to secure
the mortgagee for indorsing the note of the mortgagor for that
sum at the bank, and the note was renewed at the bank from time
to time, being one time reduced as low as $600, and was finally
protested for $720, upon the mortgagor becoming insolvent, it was
held to be a portion of the original debt secured by the mortgage.
And where the mortgagee gave the mortgagor his check to take
up the note secured by the mortgage to save it being protested, it
was held no extinguishment of the security. .Rogers vs. The
Traders' Insurance Company, 6 Paige R. 583.
14. In some late cases this allowance of substituted securities
has been carried so far as seemingly to disregard the proper
distinction between the creation of a new debt and the renewal of
an existing one. In the case of Hubbard vs. Converse, 34 Vt.
R., it was held that where the mortgagor gave security by way
of mortgage to the amount of $25,000, expressed in a bill of
exchange or draft for that sum, whereupon he was allowed to draw
from time to time upon the bank for sums not exceeding $25,000
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in the aggregate ; and in taking up that draft was ini every instance
required to pay money before any subsequent draft would be
honored ;" it was held that the mortgage security continued to
maintain its priority notwithstanding a subsequent mortgage, of
which the mortgagees had due notice long before the date ef the
drafts in existence at the time of the failure of the mortgagor.
Aud in Rowan vs. Sharp'8 .Bfle Company, 29 Conn. R. 282, it
is decided that where the legal title of land was conveyed to the
plaintiffs as security for the performance of a certain contract
undertaken by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, viz. the manufacturing of twenty thousand rifles, on condition of having an advance
of 840,000; and the possession being in the mortgagor and he
having made erections and put machinery upon it to the value of
more than $100,000 and given a subsequent mortgage for the
security of the debts incurred by the purchase of some of this
machinery, which had been duly registered; and the mortgagee
having advanced $75,000 beyond the, $40,000 stipulated to be
advanced, and the mortgagee having received actual notice of the
junior mortgage at some period after the date of the registry, it
was held the first mortgagee was not affected by the registry of
the subsequent mortgage, but that after actual notice of such
subsequent mortgage, he was not justified in making further
advances upon the faith of his' security, except so far as was
requisite to complete, or to enable the mortgagor to complete the
contract. These illustrations might be carried much further, but
enough has been shown to exhibit the extreme limit to which it
has been carried.
15. We feel justified in saying that the fair result of the
American cases upon this subject, which are quite numerous,
many of which will be found digested 1 Hilliard on Mort. 449 et
8eq., is, that where no actual release of the mortgage securities was
intended, as between the parties, and no actual payment of the
same has been made by .the money of the debtor, although there
may have been an actual payment by the money of some other
party, without any express agreement to subrogate such party to
the rights of the mortgagee, the mortgage will still be held as a
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valid security. Kinley vs. Bill, 4 Watts & Serg. 426.

This last

case is where the mortgage debt had been paid with funds of which
the debtor was the cestui que trust, and it was held to have satisfied the security. 1 Hilliard on Mort. 460, and cases cited.
16. There is no doubt some difficulty in reducing all the facts
in the different cases reported upon this point to the same principle.
In some cases the same fact has been regarded as evidence of an
intention to release the mortgage security, and in others not. In
.Fowler vs. Bush, 21 Pick. R. 230, where the mortgagee demanded
payment of the first instalment upon the mortgage to enable him
to sell the mortgage, and the mortgagor gave a negotiable promissory note for the amount payable in four months to enable the
creditor to raise the money by having the note discounted at the
bank, and the first instalment was accordingly indorsed as satisfied,
it was held that this clearly evidenced an intention to treat the
substituted note as payment of the mortgage note, the mortgage
having been assigned, and the suit brought by the assignee, the
debtor having in the mean time become insolvent, and the note for
the first instalment having been paid by the indorsee, who now
claimed the right to a lien upon the mortgage security for his
indemnity. The case is put by SAw, Ch. J., expressly upon the
ground of the intention of the parties at the time the note was
given; distinguishing it from other cases, of a similar character,
where no such intention was manifested, viz. Davis vs. Maynard,
9 Mass. R. 242; Crane vs. March, 4 Pick. R. 131; Watkins vs.
.fill, 8 Pick. R. 522; Pomroy vs. Rice, 16 Pick. R. 22. And in
Bonham vs. Galloway, 13 Illinois R. 68, it seems to have been
considered that a mortgage to secure one for indorsing the note
of the mortgagee, conditioned to be void if the mortgagor should
satisfy his note, by renewal or otherwise, which he did by renewing
his note with other indorsers, to whom the mortgagee assigned the
mortgage, could not be held as a subsisting security for such
purpose. This case seems to have turned upon the import of the
condition. And where the mortgagee takes the note of the assignee
of the mortgage for the amount due upon the note of the mortgagor
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and surrenders the latter, it will, prim facie, be regarded: as payment. And where the securities described in the condition of a
mortgage are exchanged, without the consent of others jointly
interested in the security, it has been held payment, as to them.
Van Ben8selaer vs. Akin, 22 Wendell 549.
17. But as we have before said, this whole class of cases turns
upon the intention of the parties as evidenced by the attending
circumstances, to be determined as matter of fact, and the attending
equities of others incidentally interested in having the incumbrance
paid off or kept on foot, as the case may be, and will scarcely
justify a more extended citation of cases or discussion here. It
must be obvious to all, from what we have already shown, that the
registry of the mortgage can only be relied upon to the extent of
furnishing facts, sufficient to put the parties interested in learning
the state of the title, upon inquiry in the proper direction, and
giving such a clue to the ultimate facts desired, as will enable them
by proper diligence to ascertain them. And some of the states
have gone so far as to hold an absolute deed in fee simple given to
secure a debt, as a valid security, as to third parties, even, as it
unquestionably is in regard to the parties. Marks vs. Pell, 1
Johns. Ch. R. 594; 2 Greenleaf's Cruise 67 and note. In this
note the subject of parol defeasances is considerably discussed and
many of the cases referred to. Most of the cases hold such deeds
fraudulent as against existing creditors, upon the ground that the
transaction, as defined in the deed, is not the same which actually
occurred, and that the deed is therefore colorable, and calculated to
mislead. But in some of the states such a conveyance is held
valid even as to creditors. Wright vs. Bates, 13 Vt. R. 341;
Cibson vs. Selmour, 4 Vt. R. 518. And since it is now firmly
established, in most of the American states, where the practice of
registration generally exists, that there is no necessity of having
the registry present the true state of the indebtedness, as it
existed at the date of the mortgage, and subsequently, there seems
no valid reason why a security for debt, created by way of an
absolute conveyance, may not be held equally valid, as to creditors,
that it is between the parties.
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II. The far more important question is now to be considered,
as to the nature and validity of mortgages to secure future ad
vances.
1. The idea of giving security in advance for future credits, is
one of very early origin in the commercial transactions of men. The
principle of retaining the thing pledged or mortgaged, not only until
the payment of the specific debt created at the time of the transaction, but until all subsequent indebtedness was cancelled, is distinctly
recognised in the Roman Civil Law. JACKSON, J., in Jarvis vs.
Rogers, 15 Mass. R. 406, 407, and cases cited. Chancellor KENT,
4 Comm. 136, n. (a.) thus defines the Roman Civil Law in regard
to this point: "The mortgage could be held as security for
further advances. (Code 8, 27, 1.)" " The mortgagee was allowed
to tack subsequent debts, in case of redemption, though this was
not permitted to the extent of impairing the rights of intermediate incumbrances. Dig. 20, 4, 3, 20, 4, 20; Code 8, 27, 1."
Hence, it may fairly be presumed, originated the English law of
tacking subsequent indebtedness to an existing mortgage, notwithstanding any intervening lien. Mr. Justice STO-RY denies that being
the origin of the English law upon that subject. 1 Eq. J. § 415, and
note and cases, and authorities cited. But see Powell on Mort.
(by Coventry) vol. 2, p. 454.
2. It must be confessed that an inspection of the authorities referred to, which have fallen in our way without much
effort, rather tend to raise the doubt insisted upon by Mr.
Justice STORY, in regard to the English law of tacking existing in the civil law, notwithstanding the preponderance of
modern opinion, that by the civil law the creditor was allowed to
retain both the pignus and the bypotheca until paid all the debtor
owed him, even after other liens had expired, without notice to the
first mortgagee, until he had given further credit. And Domat,
B. III. Part I. Tit. I. Sect. I. Art. IV., lays down the rule in
distinct terms : " If a person, foreseeing that in a short time he
may have occasion to borrow money, obliges himself, beforehand,
for the sum which he shall afterwards borrow, and mortgages his
estate for this loan that is to be contracted, the mortgage stipulated on such account will be without effect."
This would seem to
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favor the view, that by the civil law all securities expressed to be
for furure advances were held invalid. But a careful examinatiolh
of the authorities quoted by I.omat' upon this point, renders it
quite evident that this declaration had reference only to the time
intervening between the execution of the mortgage and the making
of the advances, and that the rule will not probably apply to that
period even, where the creditor obliges himself, at the date of the
mortgage, to make the advance at some future time named; and
this does not vary essentially from the present rule of equity
jurisprudence upon the subject to which we shall have occasion to
refer hereafter.
3. But, waiving all inquiry further into the origin of the rule,
there can be no question the right does exist, in the English
law, for a third mortgagee, whose debt was contracted in ignorance of the second mortgage, by purchasing in the first mortgage,
to insist upon the payment of the whole sum then due him, before
the second mortgagee can derive any benefit from the mortgaged
estate. 1 Story's Eq. J. § 412; Spencer vs. -Pearson,24 Beavan
266. This is allowed upon the familiar rule of equity jurisprudence, that one whose equity is equal may stand upon his superior
legal right, without any interference on the .part of the courts of
equity, under which maxim bond fide purchasers of an estate,
without notice -of any defect in the title, may defend themselves'
against any such defect, when discovered, by purchasing in any
statute, mortgage, or other outstanding incumbrance upon the
estate; and equity, it is said, will act upon the wise policy of the
common law of protecting and guarding lawful possessions, and
strengthening such titles.
4. But it has been seriously questioned, and, as it seems to us,
not without reason, whether the equities are entirely equal between a second and third mortgagee, both of whom have contracted
their debt and taken their security, supposing there was no
incumbrance on the estate beyond the first mortgage. After the
fact of the second mortgage is made known to the third mortgagee,
it seems scarcely fair and just to say they are in equal position,
in an equitable point of light. It may be true that they gave
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credit equally to the same property; but one gave such credit
rightfully, and the other not. It would he deemed a very unjust
statement of the equities of two persons, one of whom had purchased goods of one who took them feloniously, and the other of
the true owner, to say they stood precisely equal in an equitable
point of view. The most which can fairly be said in favor of
tacking is, that any party having given credit in good faith to one
professing to have title to property, and upon the faith of such
property, must be said to stand in so much more favorable light
than if he had known of the defect of title, that he may be
allowed to protect himself by purchasing in the legal title. This
shows that Lord HALE'S term of tabula in naufragio, a plank in
a shipwreck, which he applied to the right of the third mortgagee to protect himself by purchasing in the first mortgage,
Marsh vs. Lee, 2 Ventris 337, was not without some significance.
The rule must have originated more in the disproportionate deference paid to legal estates above mere equitable ones, than in any
belief of the equities being equal.
5. It seems to be well settled that if the third mortgagee knew
of the second mortgage, at the time he gave credit, he cannot beallowed to tack his mortgage to the first; for in such case there
is no pretence for saying that the equities are equal. Toulmin vs.
Steere, 3 Mer. R. 211; Lacey vs. Ingle, 2 Phillips' Ch. R. 413.
Nor can a judgment-creditor, or any other not having given
credit expressly to the land, at the time of contracting his debt,
be allowed to tack his lien to a prior legal estate, so as to exclude
an intervening incumbrance. Brace vs. The Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Wins. 491, 495; Lord ELDON, Chancellor, in -x
parte Knott, 11 Vesey 617. The cases are numerous, and the
discussions almost endless, in the English Equity Reports, in
regard to the different circumstances under which a creditor may
be said to have such degree of equity as to be permitted to tack
his debt to an-outstanding legal estate. But as the law has never
prevailed in the United States, and is in no just sense allowable
where a law for the registration of land titles exists, it will not be
important to consider the subject further, it having been examined
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thus far chiefly on account of its analogy to, and its bearing upon
mortgages for securing future advances. Grant vs. U. S. Bank,
1 Caine's Cas. in Error 112; Parkist vs. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch.
R. 399; Story's Eq. Jur. § 419, and note and cases cited.
6. Contracts for future advances are sometimes made part of
the security given for their payment; and in such cases the mortgages are the same, to all intents, as if the consideration of the
indebtedness had been paid at the time the contract for their
payment was given. No future incumbrance upon the same estate
can interpose, so as to postpone the security of the first mortgage,
and the mortgagee may make the advances stipulated even after
notice of a later mortgage. Crane vs. Deming, 7 Conn. R. 387;
Moroney'8 Appeal, 3 Am. Law Reg. 169; Ter Ifoven vs. Kerns,
2 Barr 86; Parmentiervs. 'illespie, 9 Barr R. 86. It seems to
be requisite that such contract to make future advances to enable
the mortgagee to persist in making them, after an intervening
incumbrance, should form a constituent part of the original contract, and bind both parties, the one to make and the other to
accept such advances. But it" is not requisite that it should all
be expressed in one instrument. It will have the same force if
the covenant to make such future advances be contained in a
separate instrument. Brightly Eq. Jur. 289; Moroney's Appeal, 3
Am. Law Reg. .169.
7. The most important class of mortgages to secure future
advances, is where .the future advances contemplated, at the time
of giving the security, and expected by both parties to be made,
provided there is no change of circumstances or of credit; but,
where nevertheless it is optional with both parties, to put an end to
the dealings at any moment, sometimes by definite notice to that
effect, and sometimes by simple refusal to continue the dealings.
This class embraces by far the greater number of cases coming
under this general denomination of mortgages to secure future
advances, and partially covers the entire ground which is practically important, in a commercial point of view. For contracto,
where the mortgagee binds himself absolutely to make future
advances, are not common in practice, and not different in principle,
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from those where the advance is made at the date of the mortgage.
And these few contracts, where the mortgagee, not contemplating
at the time any further transactions with the mortgagor, inserts a
clause, to save all possible contingencies, to cover any accidental
future advances, is not very different from a second mortgage,
and, there is, perhaps, no unreasonableness in treating this class
of contracts, in the same way we do those which are wholly independent, making the registry of any intervening incumbrance
notice to the first mortgagee. But we shall again advert to the
question of notice.
8. But the numerous class of cases of dealings with banks
and bankers, and guarantors and indorsers, and the like, where
extensive and hazardous credits are being constantly given, from
day to day and hour to hour, where it is just, and equitable that
security should be given, to cover future transactions, are of great
interest to business, and especially commercial men, and they are
not entirely free from difficulty. Hence, within the last two years,
in England especially, questions connected with transactions of this
character have been more discussed, than for many years preceding.
Many of the cases connected with these questions have not been
republished in this country, indeed very few of them have been,
in any such form as to be accessible to the profession generally.
We shall therefore, make no apology, for, giving .a somewhat
detailed analysis of the recent English decisions, and of the
American cases bearing upon the points discussed, being persuaded
that it cannot fail to be of more practical use to the profession,
than anything else we could give them, just at this time.
9. The case of Gordon vs. Graham, 2 Eq. Cas: Ab. 598, pl. 16,
S. C. 7 Finer's Ab. 52 E, was the leading case in the English books,
in regard to the right of the first mortgagee who had taken his
mortgage to secure future advances, to continue to make such
advances 'with safety, notwithstanding he might make them after
full notice of an intervening incumbrance. There can be no question the reports of the case declare that Lord CowPER, the Chancellor, distinctly decided in that case, that if the second mortgagee,
at the time of taking his mortgage, had notice of the prior mort-
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gage being taken to secure future advances, he was acting in bad
faith towards the first mortgagee, in attempting to defeat the full
effect of his security, by taking another mortgage; and that he
should therefore be postponed. But where the second mortgagee
took his security, without knowledge of the prior mortgage, and
gave notice to the first mortgagee of the existence of his mortgage,
the first mortgagee would be bound to respect such security thereafter. This was in accordance with the literal import of the first
mortgage, and in analogy to the decisions of the English Equity
Courts, in regard to the right of taking subordinate incumbrances.
And it is generally laid down in the English treatises upon the
subject, as the settled rule of law. But it had been questioned by
Mr. Coventry, in his -edition of Powell on Mortgages, 1822, and
by Lord St. Leonards, Chancellor of Ireland, in Blunden vs.
.Desart, 2 Dru. & W. 431, and by others, and especially by the
American Courts. But it maintained its ground in England until
a very late period.
10. But when the principle of the decision came to be critically
examined by counsel and by the Master of the Rolls, in Shaw vs.
Neal, 20 Beavan 157; S. C. on appeal, 6 H. of Lds. Cas. 581, the

rule was pointedly dissented from by Sir
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but the case was finally disposed of without distinctly overruling
the case of Gordon vs. Graham, although it has sometimes been
asserted, that the case of Gordon vs. Graham was distinctly overruled in Shaw vs. Neal by the House of Lords. See Lord CAMPBELL, Chancellor, in House of Lords; Hfopkinson vs. Bolt, 7 Jur.
N. S. 1212, May 1861.
11. But the case of Gordon vs. Graham, came again , under
review in the case of BRolt vs. ffopkinon, 25 Beavan 461, and was
distinctly dissented from by the learned judge Sir JOHN ROMiLLY,
M. R., although not formally overruled. But when this case came
before the Lord Chancellor, on appeal, that learned judge (Lord
CHELMSFORD),

deemed it necessary to examine the foundation of

its authority, and it was distinctly overruled: 4 Jur. N. S. 1119;
S. C. 3 De Gex & Jones 177, as far as any case can be said to be
overruled, by any court not of the last resort. This case was
VOL. XI.-2
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carried by appeal before the House of Lords, and after a labored
examination of the Registrar's office, that dourt came to the concluston, that Gordon vs. Graham was not correctly reported, and
that if it was, it could not be maintained as sound law, and was,
therefore, formally overruled by the court of final jurisdiction.
Lord CRANW0RTH dissenting.
12. It is not important now to inquire into the grounds of this
last decision, since it conforms substantially, to what had long
been the American rule upon the subject. It goes mainly upon
the ground, that where there is no binding contract, in regard to
such future advances on the part of the mortgagee, the whole
matter rests merely in negotiation, and continues optional with
both parties, until the advances are actually made. The security
as to such future advances, consequently has no binding force,
and no vitality or validity, until the advances are made. It is
very obvious, therefore, that as the debtor has the election whether
he will accept any further advances, there can be no obligation on
his part not to negotiate with other parties for such advances upon
the further credit of a mortgage upon the same estate. He must
do this if the first mortgagee declines to make them, and he may
do it, if for any reason he prefers to transfer his account to
another house. And if the mortgagor has this election, there can
be no wrong in a party, to whom he applies to make such further
advances, upon the credit of the mortgagor's remaining interest
in the estate doing so. The application to the second mortgagee
is a virtual election on the part of the mortgagor, to nullify the
optional portion of the first mortgage, as to furthe advances.
13. But after this is done, and the estate, in good faith, pledged
to a subsequent mortgagee for such further advances, and all this
is made known to the first mortgagee, it can be nothing short of
bad faith, for him then to allow a further credit to the mortgagor,
if l e does it with the purpose of compelling payment out of the
estate, at the expense of the second mortgagee: N'Daniels vs.
Colvin, 16 Yert. R. 300.
14. The most important remaining inquiry is in regard to the
extent, and kind of notice of the subsequent mortgage, which it is
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requisite the first mortgagee should have, in order to postpone his
further advances to such intervening security. As a general rule,
it has been considered that the registry of the second mortgage,
will only be notice of its contents to future purchasers and incumbrancers, and not to prior incumbrancers, thus operating forward
and not backward. This is highly reasonable, if we apply it only
to such past transactions as are not likely to direct the attention
of the party to the registry. And that is the case where the
future advances are contemplated to be made, from day to day,
and hour to hour, and involve a continuous dealing, as with
bankers and brokers, where the balance is constantly changing.
The requirement that one should, under such circumstances, constantly watch the registry, or act at his peril, would tend to render
such continuing security of little avail. But where the clause for
securing future advances is inserted, as a mere safeguard, and
with no present expectation of the parties-that it will be acted
upon, and the parties do subsequently negotiate a further distinct
loan, there seems no hardship, in requiring the first mortgagee to
examine the registry, before he make such further loan. Accordingly, we find the law established in some of the states, that the
registry is full notice to the first mortgagee, not to make further
advances under his mortgage: Spader vs. Lawler, 17 Ohio R. 371;
Ter Hoven vs. Kerns, 2 Barr 96; Parmentier vs. Gillespie,
9 Barr 86.
15. But the general view of the American courts, and the urn.
form declaration of the English courts, as far as we know, is, that
nothing short of notice in fact will have this effect. It is expressed
under various forms of language, but the result of the whole is,
that if the first mortgagee have knowledge of the existence of a
second mortgage upon the estate, he cannot give further credit
upon his prior mortgage, provided it is entirely optional with him,
whether to make further advances or not. This has been often
declared by judges and text writers, and may now be regarded as
settled law, notwithstanding an occasional case seems to require
In MeDaniels vs. Oolvin, 16 Vt. R. 300, it
something more.
seems to be required that the second mortgagee should give express
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and formal notice of his incumbrance, by way of admonition to the
first mortgagee not to deal further upon the credit of his security.
But this subject was a good deal examined, and considered by that
court, when the late case of R'ubbard's Estate vs. Converse, supra,
was before them, and although the court decided that case upon
the ground that the successive discounts were mere renewals of the
original gross sum of $25,000 named in the mortgage as a standing
security, and although it is intimated in the rescript filed by the
court, at the time of entering up judgment, that a majority of the
court were not prepared to depart from the rule laid down in
McNDaniels vs. Colvin, as the law of that state, it having been so
long received and acted upon as the settled law of the state, it is
nevertheless clearly shown in the same rescript, by the judge
delivering the opinion of the court, that all which the law requires
in such cases is, that the first mortgagee, before he gives the
credit, should have had a distinct knowledge of the existence of
the intervening incumbrance; and that it is not material how this
knowledge is acquired, provided it be in such a way as to gain
confidence with the first mortgagee, as being authentic.
16. It scarcely seems necessary to occupy much space upon
this point. With the exception of the case of MeDaniels vs.
Colvin, supra, the current of authority seems to be all one way.
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Szirras vs. Craig; supra, uses
the language "actual notice brought home to the party." In
Truscott vs. Xing, 6 Barb. S. C. 346, the form of language is,
"cactual notice of the second mortgage." In Prye vs. The Bank
of illinois, 11 Illinois R. 381, the notice to the first mortgagee
was from the accident of his being the public officer, or his assistant,
who made the registry of the second mortgage. In Craig vs.
Taypin, 2 Sanf. Ch. R. 78, the first mortgagee was apprised of the
mortgagor's intention soon to execute a mortgage to the second
mortgagee, and the court held that sufficient notice, as to 'all
advances made after the actual execution of the second mortgage.
In Stuyvesant vs. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. R. 159, the requisite notice
to affect one with fraud in equity is thus defined: "cHis conscience
is not affected unless he is informed of the existence of the facts
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upon which the equitable right depended, or had sufficient notice
to put him on inquiry." And in kTontefiore vs. Browne, 7 House
Lds. Cas. 269, the matter is thus defined: " One is affected with
notice of a fact which he might have learned on such inquiry as
all prudent* men would naturally make in a question where they
were personally interested." And in New York, where equitable
rights take precedence from their date, if notified before action
brought, Chancellor KENT uses this language, .inregard to the
present question, Brinkerhoff vs. Marvin, 5 Johns. Ch.R. 326, 327:
"Where a subsequent judgment or mortgage intervened, further
advances, after that period, could not be covered." The italics
are in the original, and would seem to indicate an opinion that
such an equity must operate from its date. The learned Chancellor
uses similar language in 4 Comm. 175, 176; James vs. Johnson, 6
Johns. Ch. R. 417, 432. We prefer to say, that in all cases, and
this is no exception, third parties are bound to respect an equity
from the moment they have such knowledge of its existence as to
create belief. See Sir JoHN RoMILLY'S opinion in Rolt vs. Hopkinson, 25 Beavan 461. The text writers have adopted similar
forms of expression. The case of McDaniels vs. Colvin stands
quite alone in its requirements in regard to notice, and was influenced, no doubt, mainly, at the time the decision was made, by a
consideration of the rule laid down in Gordon vs. Graham, and
the extreme caution of Chief Justice WILLIAMS, in defining the
requisite notice, unquestionably resulted from his desire to lay
down an unexceptionable qualification of that case. But since
that case has been abandoned in England, there seems no necessity,
and no propriety, in following those extreme safeguards laid down
to bridge that case over.
We trust we have been able to make ourselves understood in
the foregoing exposition of the principles and authorities connected
with the registry of mortgages and the true limit of securities for
future advances. And if we.have been able to accomplish that, it
is all which we purposed in the outset.
I. F. R.

